Diane D. Blair, Jay Barth Arkansas Politics and Government, Second Edition (2005)

Podstrony

[ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
.5822 The second function, administrative oversight, is more problematic.The23 legislature s most important instruments for supervising the executive branch[218], (33)24 is the extensive review of budget requests performed by the sixty-eight25 members on the combined Legislative Council and Joint Budget Committee26 and the continuous postauditing conducted by the Legislative Joint Auditing27 Committee.The details and politics of this fiscal review process are discussed28 in chapter 13, but it is important to note here that no more effective means29 exists for ensuring administrative discipline than the threat of reducing or30 denying funds.Since the legislative branch is intended to be the guardian31 of the public purse, there is no question of its right to grill agency heads32 during budget hearings, or to ensure that appropriated funds are being spent33 according to legislative intent.34 Beginning in 1969, however, the legislature began requiring state agencies35 to obtain the advice of the Legislative Council (specifically, the Coun-36 cil s Review and Advice Committee) before taking certain actions, such as37 granting exceptions to the uniform classification and compensation plan for38 state employees, awarding professional service contracts involving more39 than $5,000, or anointing federal grant applications.This requirement raisedThe Power and Politics of the Legislative Branch 2191 constant questions about the appropriate line between legitimate legislative2 oversight and unlawful interference with executive authority.In 1988, the3 state supreme court declared that this process was indeed an unconstitu-4 tional violation of the principle of separation of powers.The result was an5 undeniable reduction in legislative oversight power.596 Aside from the more typical budgetary powers that remain, the legislature7 is ill equipped to oversee the operations of state agencies in any systematic8 manner.A sunset law enacted with great fanfare in 1977 would have9 abolished 283 state agencies over a six-year period unless each agency was10 found worthy of being continued.However, it was effectively repealed in11 1983 because the Joint Performance Review Committee had neither the12 time nor the staff to do continuous, effective performance evaluations on[219], (34)13 that many agencies.6014 As a practical matter then, the most pervasive form of legislative oversight15 is stimulated neither by laws nor by committee mandates but by constituentLines: 429 to16 or interest-group complaints or media attention that stir legislators into 17 investigatory and sometimes punitive action.When the pollution control0.0pt PgV18 agency tried to close a cotton gin on the grounds that its emissions were 19 health threatening, the representative from that district proposed legislationNormal Page20 exempting cotton gins from state air pollution control regulations.When thePgEnds: TEX21 Livestock and Poultry Commission filed suit against a livestock sale barn,22 alleging failure to comply with state brucellosis regulations, the senator23 from that district (who was also the attorney for the sale barn) attached[219], (34)24 an amendment to the commission s appropriations bill to weaken the reg-25 ulations, prompting the commission director to resign.When the former26 state computer czar released e-mails that highlighted deficiencies in the27 integrated computer system (and included governor s office potshots at the28 legislature), an intense media firestorm developed that led the Legislative29 Council to form its first specially called session in three decades to investigate30 the charges.These and countless other examples underscore the Arkansas31 legislature s extreme responsiveness to constituency demands.They also32 suggest that oversight is episodic and punitive rather than systematic and33 constructive and that it is prompted more by parochial pressures than by34 general public policy concerns.Legislators are aware of the institution s35 weakness at this oversight role, according to a 2001 survey, and feel term36 limits further diminish its ability to fully carry it out.6137 Similar criticisms are justified with respect to the legislature s third38 and presumably most fundamental lawmaking function.The contemporary39 Arkansas legislature is meeting longer, passing more bills, and appropri-220 The Power and Politics of the Legislative Branch1 ating much more money than would have seemed possible in the recent2 past.The interim committees combined with the ceaseless exertions of3 a few lawmakers have given the General Assembly a more constant and4 consequential role in state governance, and the institutional reforms of the5 1970s produced a much more orderly, serious, and impressive legislative6 operation.The legislature also gets high marks for its wholehearted desire to7 please and represent those who have expressed or ascertainable preferences.8 Because of a strong district orientation, legislators are especially successful9 at drawing attention to local interests and objections when state policy10 is being made.According to legislators themselves, however, Statewide11 policy decisions are largely the governor s responsibility [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]

zanotowane.pl

doc.pisz.pl

pdf.pisz.pl

bezglutenowo.pev.pl