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.The Soviets did not deploy a 1,500-mile missile.See Ch.3.92.Hansard, 2 March 1960, col.1211.93.Hansard, 17 March 1960, cols 1474 6.94.Hansard, 25 March 1960, cols 811 906.95.AIR 2/15326 CMS.3340, 18 October 1960.96.AIR 19/896 VCAS.1736, 29 March 1961.97.RAF Fylingdales Station Brief supplied to author, December 2000.98.Cmnd 2901, Statement on the Defence Estimates 1966, February 1966, p.34.99.DEFE 7/1390 DRP/P(62)56, Project Legate UK Display Facilities for BMEWS (ASR2208), 17 July 1962.100.DEFE 10/417 DRP/M(62)12, 25 July 1962.101.AIR 2/17990 F6(f)(Air)/2900, 16 June 1967.102.AIR 2/17990 AF/1105/S9(Air), 6 July 1967.103.AIR 2/17990, Value of BMEWS to UK 1969 74, 4 December 1967.104.AIR 2/17990 loose minute, undated.105.DEFE 13/995, Nicholls to SofS, 16 August 1974.106.Allied Command Europe.107.DEFE 13/995 CAS 91092, 25 October 1978.108.www.gn.apc.org/cndyorks/fdales109.Fylingdales Brief.110.Peter Little, The Role of BMEWS in Ballistic Missile Defence , Journal of DefenceScience, Vol.2, No.1, January 1997.111.Fylingdales Brief. 6US ABM DeploymentEARLY INTERESTUK interest in US views about, and work on, defence against ballistic missiles beganeven before Britain s own postwar research programme.The 1949 intelligenceconference and the 1953 Conference Ally 1 were early manifestations of that interest andthe start of a diverse and developing pattern of cooperation throughout the 1950s.By1956 the Americans were describing their own ABM developments to the British,2 withinthe context of an exchange of views on active defence techniques.These exchangescontinued, largely through the medium of Sub-Group F.In October 1958 the ChiefScientist reported to the Defence Board that the Americans were planning to deploy asystem for the defence of North America by 1963, but that as their problem was different,the system might not be effective for the UK.3 It was recognised that the United Stateswas a good further along the road ,4 and as the technological and financial scale of theproblem became ever-more clear, the need to combine efforts with the Americansbecame pressing.5 The US Nike-Zeus6 system was of interest to Britain as a possibleABM alternative to Red Duster (Bloodhound), and to inform British work on a dedicatedABM interceptor.In 1960 the British contribution to the ABM problem was acknowledged by the newMinistry of Aviation as small and probably of little significance to the US, [but]& thesame uncertainties which we have experienced have, in fact, been met by theAmericans.7 After a SubGroup F meeting in October, the UK Chairman reported that ballistic missile defence continues to be an intractable subject, but US [sic] are preparedto continue pouring a lot of money into it.8In 1961 the Powell Committee (see Chapter 3) noted that the Nike-Zeus programmewas stalled because of the decoy discrimination problem, but that work was alsoproceeding on satellite-based, launch-phase defences, such as BAMBI,9 to solve thediscrimination problem.An idealistic note was sounded with the hope that such a systemcould, ideally, be run as an international undertaking preventing all ballistic missiles andsatellite launchings excepting those authorised for scientific purposes.The TechnicalSub-Committee reported that Death Rays were also being investigated using a proton orelectron high-energy beam.10Britain received detailed reports on Project Hyvia , a US Air Force researchprogramme conducted by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.11 Hyviainvestigated basic technologies and techniques involved in interception of high-altitude,hyper-velocity vehicles, such as ICBMs and satellites.Much of this research laid thefoundations for the exotic technologies that were the basis of the 1980s StrategicDefensive Initiative (SDI) (Chapter 8). Britain and ballistic missile defence 1942 2002 100In August 1962 a UK delegation to the United States was briefed on the US Army sField Army Ballistic Missile Defense System, an operational requirement for a mobilesystem to replace the existing Hawk and Nike-Hercules surface-to-air missiles.It wouldbe capable of engaging missiles with ranges of up to 2,000 km
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