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.In the words of DwightChapin, deputy assistant to the president, Moscow was going to be“more of a business trip, whereas China was just opening a channel.”65 Yet as a canny politician Nixon sought to dampen media speculation; otherwise, he told Kissinger, “when we do make the formal agreements there will be no real news value to them.” He even wanted to promote “a line of pessimism with regard to what may be accomplished,” particularly on SALT, to prevent his bête noire Gerry Smith claiming credit for it before the summit.66Brezhnev shared Nixon’s concern that everything should cometo the boil nicely at the summit.He instructed his official arms control negotiator,Vladimir Semyenov, to draw out the SALT talks while keeping him informed.67 A grain deal was now particularly important: in March the Central Committee had held emergencydiscussions about the poor crop of winter wheat.Like the White House, however, the Kremlin also saw more at stake than a fewsubstantive deals that would yield economic and political benefits.It seemed clear that the Nixon administration was now willing to take the Soviet Union seriously as an equal partner, and this represented a dramatic tilt in the balance of the Cold War.Looking beyond merely an arms control agreement, Brezhnevand Gromyko hoped to conclude a pact renouncing nuclear warand another articulating the basic principles of Soviet-American relations.Coupled with the Berlin agreements, signed in September 1971 and now awaiting ratification by the West German Bun-destag, these would reduce the danger of war in Europe and signal a Soviet-American condominium in international affairs.Thatwould be a lesson to the Chinese and also evidence to the world that the Soviet Union had come of age.The Kremlin also hopedfor a summit agreement on the Middle East, to offset Israel’s new 247reynolds_02.qxd 8/31/07 10:29 AM Page 248sum m i t spower after the 1967 war and further demonstrate the SovietUnion’s global role.Some of Moscow’s goals were utopian.The White House had nointerest in renouncing nuclear war—its possibility was the underlying premise of deterrence and the bedrock of NATO.Nor was itready, particularly in an election year, to lean on Israel, given the importance of the Jewish lobby in American politics.On March 17Dobrynin complained that Kissinger was “producing one red her-ring after another to avoid facing concrete issues” about the Middle East.68 Yet whether or not the Soviets came down from the summit with their whole package, the meeting with Nixon promisedBrezhnev huge benefits.But on March 30 the North Vietnamese army mounted a newoffensive into the south.Not only did it achieve large territorial gains, but whole units of the South Vietnamese army fell apart.Nixon was deeply shaken.Convinced of the need to wind downthe war before the election, he had been planning to follow up his Moscow summit with an announcement that most Americantroops would be out by November.69 This strategy was now injeopardy.Moreover the north’s breakthrough showed that it was still receiving substantial logistic support from Moscow and Beijing.So much for his hopes that they would both restrain Hanoi in the interests of improved relations with Washington.The president ratcheted up the bombing.But he also had to address a more fundamental question: should he call off the Moscow summit as well?How could he clink glasses in the Kremlin while Soviet-madetanks were rolling over an American ally?For Nixon Vietnam and reelection were the overriding priori-ties.He had no doubt that if his administration was seen to fail in Vietnam, it could not survive politically.If the Soviets would help, fine; if not, as seemed to be the case that spring, then he wanted to bomb North Vietnam into serious negotiations regardless of the effect on the summit.70 Kissinger, in contrast, gave the summit higher priority, partly because he believed that the U.S.could still exert leverage on Hanoi through Moscow.But also because he reckoned that, politically, two successful summits would outweigh disaster in 248reynolds_02.qxd 8/31/07 10:29 AM Page 249mo scow 1972Vietnam
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